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“[N]ot only does democracy make men forget their ancestors but also hides their 
descendants and keeps them apart from their fellows.  It constantly brings them back 
to themselves and threatens in the end to imprison them in the isolation of their own 
hearts.” 
      Alexis de Tocqueville** 
 
“Alexis de T. - but what did he know about . . . Let’s talk about Me!” 
       Tom Wolfe*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article focuses on speech that is about oneself.  The self1 is usually thought 
to be both real and important.2  Admittedly, the nature and boundaries of the self 
                                                          
 *
 Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis. 
 ** ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 589 (Gerald E. Bevan trans., 
Penguin Books 2003) (1840). 
 *** Tom Wolfe, The ‘Me’ Decade and the Third Great Awakening, N.Y. MAGAZINE, 
available at http://nymag.com/print/?/news/features/45938/index9.html. 
 
1
 As a preliminary matter, the stylistic distinction between ‘oneself’ and ‘one’s self’ is 
murky.  The case for ‘one’s self’ becomes stronger as the distinct emphasis on the ‘self’ 
increases, but the stylistic boundary line may still be unclear.  In some cases, substituting the 
parallel constructions of ‘myself’ or ‘yourself’ and checking the logic may help.  For the view 
that ‘one’s self’ is often more correct in psychological or spiritual contexts, see BRYAN A. 
GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 592 (3d ed. 2009).  On the other hand, if the 
‘one’s self’ usage suggests that the self is anything like a personal possession—in which one 
speaks of one’s self roughly as one might speak of one’s lunch bucket, or even one’s mood—
that usage is hardly philosophically or spiritually neutral. 
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may be unclear.3  Some writers go so far as to reject familiar ideas of the self, the 
person, and personal identity.4  Other writers, however, hold that there is indeed such 
a familiar self, and that there are boundaries of the self.5 
It is thus admittedly possible that even our most basic ideas of the self are 
illusions, even if they are useful or even unavoidable, illusions.6  Such a skeptical 
conclusion about the self would, however, seem to call for a major reassessment of 
our Bill of Rights law, along with the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,7 as 
well as our language and broader culture.  This Article will not take any such 
skeptical path. 
Instead, this Article simply assumes some more or less familiar idea of the self.  
This non-skeptical approach to the self accords with what ordinary citizens, typical 
litigants, relevant constitutional theorists,8 and the case law9 have widely assumed.  
The controversial focus herein is instead on the proper degree of First Amendment 
protection for speech that is about10 the speaker,11 and is in that sense 
autobiographical or self-focused speech. 
                                                          
 
2
 The character of Sir Thomas More vividly links the self to integrity: “When a man takes 
an oath, Meg, he’s holding his own self in his own hands.  Like water . . . And if he opens his 
fingers then—he needn’t hope to find himself again.”  ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL 
SEASONS 140 (Vintage Int’l ed. 1990) (1960). 
 
3
 For an image of holism and inseparability in this regard, see WALT WHITMAN, SONG OF 
MYSELF: THE FIRST AND FINAL EDITIONS OF THE GREAT AMERICAN POEM 1 (Sam Torode ed. 
2010) (1855) (“For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you.”). 
 
4
 See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
 
5
 See supra note 3.  See also SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 13 
(First American ed. 1961) (1930) (“Pathology has made us acquainted with a great number of 
states in which the boundary lines between the ego and the external world become uncertain 
or in which they are actually drawn incorrectly.”).  This is not to suggest that the Freudian ego 
should be identified with the self in its entirety.  At a minimum, though, drawing the 
boundaries of the self at one point or another seems, according to Freud, to have consequences 
and to be subject to evaluation.  Without exception, the constitutional opinions examined 
herein presume some sort of distinction between the self, or the person, and a non-self, or the 
not merely self.  See infra Part IV. 
 
6
 See infra notes 94-95. 
 
7
 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The Fourteenth Amendment, in particular, of 
course refers literally to persons. 
 
8
 See infra Part IV. 
 
9
 See infra Part IV. 
 
10
 This is not to deny the problems of what it means for speech to be about, to refer to, or 
to be somehow centrally focused on the speaking self.  At least since Descartes, the distinction 
between a self that is doing the speaking, and a self that is the topic or focus of the speech, has 
been a continuing philosophical problem.  See, to begin with, RENE DESCARTES, 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 23-32 (Laurence J. Lafleur trans., 1964) (1641). 
 
11
 Nor does this Article address the extent to which the self is constituted by, and 
inseparable from, a network of various group memberships, associations, and identifications.  
For background, see GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT & THE WEB OF GROUP-AFFILIATIONS 125 
(Kurt H. Wolff & Reinhard Bendix trans., 1st Free Press paperback ed. 1964) (1922).  We 
shall assume that even a self that comprises group memberships can still be a sufficiently 
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Crucially, the idea has recently been raised that the free speech clause does, or at 
least should, protect speech that is about the speaker with generally the same 
stringency as it protects speech that is about political or other public matters.12  
Those who see speech about oneself and speech about politics as constitutionally of 
equal value usually do not claim that in this context, the self and the political can 
never be distinguished.  They do not claim that speech about oneself always involves 
political speech.  There will certainly be some cases in which speech that is about the 
speaker also amounts to political speech.13  The categories of speech about the self14 
and speech that is political clearly overlap to one degree or another.  The widely 
accepted assumption is instead that not all speech that is about the speaker is also 
political speech, or public interest speech, for first amendment purposes.  With this 
assumption, we have no quarrel. 
The advocates of strong protection for speech about oneself thus distinguish 
speech about the self, in some cases, from political or public interest speech.15  This 
Article, however, in response, rejects the idea that speech about the self and speech 
about politics should be protected equally where the categories do not overlap.  
Equating the constitutional value of the two kinds of speech is, first, clearly 
inconsistent with Supreme Court and other case law.16 
This Article further contends that elevating the constitutional protection of non-
political or non-public interest speech about the self to that of political or public 
interest speech would be ill-advised.  This judgment is based on a consideration of 
the reasons for specially protecting speech in the first place.  As it turns out, there is 
only a minimal relation between speech about the self, with no further public import, 
and any consensually recognized purpose underlying our special protection of 
speech.  Finally, we consider the cultural risks of unintentionally validating, through 
a change in first amendment law, what is widely thought of as sheer narcissism.17 
II.  NON-POLITICAL SPEECH ABOUT ONESELF AND POLITICAL SPEECH:  SUPPOSEDLY 
EQUAL IN FIRST AMENDMENT STATURE? 
The First Amendment value of speech that is about oneself has recently been 
raised in a controversial and sometimes emotional context.  Specifically, a number of 
courts have addressed an unusual element of the federal Stolen Valor Act.18  The 
                                                          
distinct self.  And in this assumption, we again track virtually all of the relevant judicial 
discussions. 
 
12
 The classic skeptical citation is to Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the 
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).  See also Carol Hanisch, The 
Personal Is Political, NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR: WOMEN’S LIBERATION (originally 
1969) http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html (‘political’ therein as referring to 
power relationships). 
 
13
 See infra Part IV. 
 
14
 For examples of literal autobiographical speech, many with a political or broadly social 
tenor, see infra notes 57-72. 
 
15
 See infra Part II. 
 
16
 See infra Part III. 
 
17
 See infra Parts III–V. 
 
18
 18 U.S.C.A. § 704(b)-(d) (West 2011). 
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Stolen Valor Act holds, in part, that “[w]hoever falsely represents himself or herself, 
verbally19 or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by 
Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States . . . shall be fined under this 
title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both.”20 
This statutory prohibition does not expressly require a showing of the 
defendant’s mens rea or of any specific harm in the particular case.  For the sake of 
simplicity, though, we may think of the criminal offense as involving a knowing 
falsehood, or lie,21 in the defendant’s claim to have been awarded a particular medal. 
Among the most notable discussions of the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor 
Act,22 certainly, is that of the distinguished scholar23 and Ninth Circuit Chief Judge 
Alex Kozinski.  Judge Kozinski’s memorable24 discussion of this issue takes the 
                                                          
 
19
 ‘Verbally’ is here apparently taken to be synonymous with ‘orally.’  For written 
discussion, see THEODORE M. BERNSTEIN, THE CAREFUL WRITER 319 (1995); BRYAN A. 
GARNER, supra note 1, at 840.  See also R.W. BURCHFIELD, FOWLER’S MODERN ENGLISH 
USAGE 820-21 (3d ed. 2004). 
 
20
 18 U.S.C.A. § 704(b) (West 2011). 
 
21
 For discussion of the free speech value of lying in certain contexts, including that of the 
Stolen Valor Act, see R. George Wright, Lying and Freedom of Speech, Utah L. Rev. 
(forthcoming  2012). 
 
22
 Constitutional assessments of the relevant sections of the Stolen Valor Act are found in, 
among other cases, United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), rehearing and 
rehearing en banc denied, 638 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Robbins, 759 F. 
Supp. 2d 815 (W.D. Va. 2011); United States v. Strandlof, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Colo. 
2010). 
 
23
 In the free speech area, see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-
History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747 (1993). 
 
24
 Perhaps most notably, consider Judge Kozinski’s remarkable taxonomy of the uses of 
lying, reproduced in full below: 
Saints may always tell the truth, but for mortals living means lying.  We lie to protect 
our privacy (“No, I don’t live around here”); to avoid hurt feelings (“Friday is my 
study night”); to make others feel better (“Gee you’ve gotten skinny”); to avoid 
recriminations (“I only lost $10 at poker”); to prevent grief (“The doc says you’re 
getting better”); to maintain domestic tranquility (“She’s just a friend”); to avoid 
social stigma (“I just haven’t met the right woman”); for career advancement (“I’m 
sooo lucky to have a smart boss like you”); to avoid being lonely (“I love opera”); to 
eliminate a rival (“He has a boyfriend”); to achieve an objective (“But I love you so 
much”); to defeat an objective (“I’m allergic to latex”); to make an exit (“It’s not you, 
it’s me”); to delay the inevitable (“The check is in the mail”); to communicate 
displeasure (“There’s nothing wrong”); to get someone off your back (“I’ll call you 
about lunch”); to escape a nudnik (“My mother’s on the other line”); to namedrop 
(“We go way back”); to set up a surprise party (“I need help moving the piano”); to 
buy time (“I’m on my way”); to keep up appearances (“We’re not talking divorce”); to 
avoid taking out the trash (“My back hurts”); to duck an obligation (“I’ve got a 
headache”); to maintain a public image (“I go to church every Sunday”); to make a 
point (“Ich bin ein Berliner”); to save face (“I had too much to drink”); to humor 
(“Correct as usual, King Friday”); to avoid embarrassment (“That wasn’t me”); to 
curry favor (“I’ve read all your books”); to get a clerkship (“You’re the greatest living 
jurist”); to save a dollar (“I gave at the office”); or to maintain innocence (“There are 
eight tiny reindeer on the rooftop”). 
 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/3
2012] THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF SPEECH ABOUT ONESELF 493 
 
form of a concurrence in the denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc of a Ninth 
Circuit case.25 
Judge Kozinski begins by remarking that “Alvarez’s conviction is especially 
troubling because he is being punished for speaking about himself; the kind of 
speech that is intimately bound up with a particularly important First Amendment 
purpose:  human self-expression.”26  By itself, this formulation gives us some flavor 
of Judge Kozinski’s more detailed perspective. 
Even at this early stage, there are already points to be noted.  First, a person’s 
claim to have been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor can, for Judge 
Kozinski’s purposes, and for our own, be treated as speech that is about the speaker.  
There is of course a sense in which a person’s claim to have won a Congressional 
Medal of Honor is inescapably relational.  Such a claim necessarily refers to persons 
and entities outside oneself who have assessed oneself favorably, in accordance with 
general standards external to the self.  In this sense, the claim is obviously social and 
institutional, and not merely personal. 
Chief Judge Kozinski doubtless does not intend to deny this, and neither do we 
herein.  That is because there is also a familiar, homespun, garden-variety sense in 
which a claim to have won a Congressional Medal of Honor is about the speaker, or 
about the speaker’s self.  One’s resume is in this sense about oneself, even if the 
resume contains misrepresentations, and is thoroughly relational and institutional in 
its reference. 
To claim to have won a prestigious award may involve an implicit (favorable) 
comparison with the many who have failed to achieve the honor in question, or more 
abstractly, with a less distinguished self.  Even narcissism itself is relational.27  But 
narcissism is also about the self.28  To claim any public recognition of one’s 
achievements—to claim any credential—is typically to speak (favorably) of and 
about oneself.  Commonly, the point of speaking about one’s receiving an award is 
to somehow address one’s presumed virtues, capacities, traits of character, 
accomplishments, or likely future performance. 
This claim can be made modestly or immodestly, even self-deprecatingly.  But to 
claim a Congressional Medal of Honor is often—perhaps even at its core—speech  
that is about, among other things, one’s own courage, one’s own grace under 
pressure, one’s luck, one’s own heroic virtue, one’s effective sense of duty or 
loyalty, or one’s own efforts to overcome fear, as later officially recognized.  Often, 
the intended effect of claiming such an award is to enhance one’s own reputation.  In 
these basic senses, to speak of oneself as the recipient of a coveted, competitive, and 
thoroughly socially-embedded award is still to speak of and about oneself. 
                                                          
Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 674 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
Compare LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 23 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 2nd ed. 1958) (presenting a list of, arguably, 26 kinds of “language-games”).  On the 
subject of lying, see the diverging perspectives of PAUL J. GRIFFITH, LYING: AN AUGUSTINIAN 
THEORY OF DUPLICITY (2004); MARK TWAIN, ON THE DECAY OF THE ART OF LYING (1885), 
available at http://www.online-literature.com/twain/1320 (last visited Jan. 13, 2012). 
 
25
 Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 673. 
 
26
 Id. at 674. 
 
27
 See infra Part V. 
 
28
 See infra Part V. 
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Judge Kozinski’s initial formulation also speaks of “human self-expression”29 
and thus of ‘self-expression.’30  The term ‘self-expression’ may have taken on one or 
more somewhat different technical meanings in the context of free speech.  We 
certainly do not object to its use here.  But we should recognize the possibility of 
ambiguity in the term ‘self-expression.’  Judge Kozinski would apparently agree that 
not all self-expressive speech is about the self.31  Some self-expression will indeed 
be about the speaking self: “I have reached the end of my rope” may be self-
expressive, and also amount to speech about the speaker.  But ‘self-expression,’ even 
if it excludes impersonal discussions of broad, abstract matters, can be ‘about’ many 
topics far removed from the speaker’s self. 
Judge Kozinski’s initial observation then refers to speech about the self as 
“intimately bound up with a particularly important first amendment purpose:  human 
self-expression.”32  For reasons we have just in part considered,33 this formulation 
holds the potential to mislead.  There can be constitutionally important self-
expressive speech that is not also about the speaker or the speaking self.  Speech can 
be in a sense self-expressive when its subject is the broad injustice of the economic 
system under which some persons known to the speaker are burdened.  Such speech 
may be of a constitutionally important general sort and may amount to speech that is 
self-expressive, in the sense of reflecting the speaker’s judgments and commitments.  
But such speech certainly need not amount to speech that is about the speaker.  This 
will remain true whether we choose to join Judge Kozinski in finding speech about 
the self “intimately bound up with”34 self-expression. 
In any event, we should pause to notice that Judge Kozinski here characterizes 
self-expression as “a particularly important first amendment purpose.”35  This is 
thought to matter especially because speech about the self is said to be intimately 
linked to self-expression.  If self-expression  is indeed a particularly crucial First 
Amendment purpose, then the closer the linkage between speech about the self and 
self-expression, the closer the linkage between speech about the self and an 
important purpose of the First Amendment. 
We need not just for the moment be concerned with the nature of the linkage 
between speech about the self and self-expression.  Rather, we should first ask 
whether it is true, as Judge Kozinski asserts, that self-expression is “a particularly 
important first amendment purpose,”36 or indeed a purpose of the First Amendment 
at all. 
As we shall explore below,37 self-expression is a complex idea.  Some may be 
tempted to treat the idea of self-expression as loosely synonymous with (free) speech 
                                                          
 
29
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 
30
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 
31
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 
32
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 
33
 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
 
34
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 
35
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 
36
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 
37
 See infra Part III. 
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itself.  If we think of self-expression as roughly equivalent to (free) speech it will not 
be surprising that self-expression will seem constitutionally important.  But it will 
then be odd and uninformative to say that self-expression is “a particularly important 
First Amendment purpose.”38  That would come too close to saying that (free) 
speech is an ‘important purpose’ of protecting free speech. 
Free speech is not generally thought to serve as anything like its own intrinsic 
purpose, aim, goal, or justification.  Free speech has a range of more or less widely 
recognized purposes.  These values are often thought to include something like the 
search for political or other truth, the promotion of a stable political democracy, and 
one or more forms of autonomy or self-realization.39  One could in a sense perhaps 
think of self-expression as itself a purpose of freedom of speech.  The potential for 
confusion, though, lies in the fact that we can at the same time obviously see self-
expressive speech—speech that is self-expressive—as a kind of speech, rather than 
as a purpose of free speech. 
Judge Kozinski then pursues the question of the constitutional value of speech 
about oneself by quoting Justice Marshall in the prison mail censorship case of 
Procunier v. Martinez.40  Justice Marshall had argued that 
[t]he First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also 
those of the human spirit—a spirit that demands self-expression.  Such 
expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of 
identity.  To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for 
recognition and affront the individual’s worth and dignity.41 
Judge Kozinski also quotes Justice Stevens to the effect that “[o]ne fundamental 
concern of the First Amendment is to ‘protec[t] the individual’s interest in self-
expression.’”42 
 An initial difficulty in the case law, however, is this: it is difficult to sort out 
holding and dicta, for present purposes.  This is especially so when a given case 
refers to self-expression—whether about the self or not—that also amounts to speech 
on a matter of public interest or public concern.43  Speech that is about a matter of 
                                                          
 
38
 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 
39
 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 6-8 (1970); JOHN 
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY chs. 2-3 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed. 1974) (1859); FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:  A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech 
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. Rev. 119 (1989). 
 
40
 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 422, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989) (applying a rational relationship to 
legitimate penological interest standard). 
 
41
 Martinez, 416 U.S. at 427, quoted in United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 
42
 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 
(1980)). 
 
43
 Preceding the passage from Justice Marshall’s opinion in Martinez quoted by Judge 
Kozinski, supra note 41 (noting that Justice Marshall states that “the plight of prisoners is a 
matter of urgent public concern”)  Martinez, 416 U.S. at 427 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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public interest and concern is all else equal44 likely on its own to evoke relatively 
strong free speech protection,45 as Judge Kozinski of course recognizes.46 
Judge Kozinski’s basic normative argument also has academic support.  
Consider, for example, the thesis of Professor Sonja R. West:47 
[T]he time-honored practice of talking about yourself has been ignored by 
legal scholars.  A consequence of this oversight is that current free speech 
principles protect the autobiographies of the powerful but leave the stories 
of “ordinary” people vulnerable to challenge.  Shifting attitudes about 
privacy combined with advanced technologies, meanwhile, have led to 
more people than ever before having both the desire and the means to tell 
their stories to a widespread audience.48 
Unlike Judge Kozinski,49 Professor West presents her analysis explicitly as a 
normative recommendation for reform of the law: “it is time for the law to recognize 
and to fully protect the freedom of autobiographical speech.”50  And Professor 
West’s emphasis, in contrast to that of Judge Kozinski, is on truthful,51 as opposed to 
lying52 as well as truthful, speech about oneself. 
Professor West argues that “[a]utobiographical speech adds vital knowledge to 
the public debate while also preserving the essence of human autonomy.”53  It should 
be emphasized, though, that Professor West54 and Judge Kozinski55 both recognize a 
distinction between political speech and autobiographical speech, or speech about 
oneself, a distinction they retain. 
                                                          
 
44
 But consider the limited protection for such speech if uttered within the scope of one’s 
public employment responsibilities.  See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 
45
 See infra Part III. 
 
46
 See United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 677 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., 
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 
47
 Sonja R. West, The Story of Me: The Underprotection of Autobiographical Speech, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 905 (2006). 
 
48
 Id. at 905.  Professor West later builds on this argument in Sonja R. West, The Story of 
Us: Resolving the Face-Off Between Autobiographical Speech and Information Privacy, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 589 (2010).  For a contrasting perspective, see Anne M. Coughlin, 
Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 
1229 (1995). 
 
49
 See Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 673-74. 
 
50
 West, supra note 47, at 905. 
 
51
 See id. (“[T]ruthful autobiographical speech deserves heightened constitutional 
protection.”). 
 
52
 See Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 674; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 
53
 West, supra note 47, at 905. Judge Kozinski, along with Justice Marshall, emphasize 
some conception of human or personal autonomy as well.  See Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 674. 
 
54
 See West, supra note 47, at 905 (stating that autobiographical speech as occupying “an 
exceptional place in the public discourse—perhaps rivaled only by political speech”). 
 
55
 See Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 673-74. 
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Before we address any normative arguments, though, we should establish the 
willingness and ability of the courts to distinguish between, and to differently value, 
speech that is about matters of public concern and speech that is about matters of 
private or personal concern.  In this respect, Judge Kozinski’s discussion does not 
aptly represent current law. 
III.  SPEECH ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN VERSUS SPEECH ON MATTERS OF 
PRIVATE OR PERSONAL CONCERN 
Let us begin with a judicially widely-recognized distinction.  Some speech that is 
about oneself is also speech that is on a matter of public concern, and some speech 
about oneself is not.  If we wish to, we can use the term ‘speech that is on a matter of 
public concern’ as a rough synonym for ‘political speech’ in a broad and very useful 
First Amendment sense.  But on any reasonable definition, not all speech that is 
about oneself will qualify as political speech or as speech on a matter of public 
concern.  There will, of course, inevitably be problems in drawing this distinction in 
borderline cases.56 
Consider a typical ‘autobiography.’  A book can be of the autobiography genre 
without every sentence in the book taking the form of autobiography, in the sense of 
being about the author or even about the author’s life.  Or we could say that in some 
sense, not every “autobiographical” sentence need be about the author.  And of 
course, the most commercialized autobiographies may involve a mixture of voices, 
as among collaborators.57  Every well-known autobiography will differ as to the 
degree of its explicit focus on the writer.  The autobiographical writer’s focus may 
be on the self, or on the writer’s surroundings, or on larger public issues and 
concerns, all to varying degrees, ranging from narrow self-absorption to complete 
immersion in important civic events. 
Consider, for example, the differences in the degrees of focus on matters of 
public, as distinct from merely private or personal, concern in even the most 
generally “politicized” or public issue-attuned autobiographies.  One might think, for 
example, of the autobiographies of Theresa of Avila,58 Simone de Beauvior,59 
Eldridge Cleaver,60 Charles Darwin,61 Frederick Douglass,62 Anne Frank,63 Benjamin 
                                                          
 
56
 See R. George Wright, Speech On Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 27 (1987). 
 
57
 See, e.g., NICHOLAS PILEGGI, WISEGUY: A LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY (1985) (showing 
complications regarding “speech about oneself” or “autobiographical speech” as litigated 
under a New York statute unsuccessfully seeking to prevent criminals from profiting from 
their published accounts of their uncompensated crimes); Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
 
58
 ST. TERESA OF AVILA, INTERIOR CASTLE (E. Allison Peers ed. & trans., Doubleday 2004) 
(1588). 
 
59
 SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, MEMOIRS OF A DUTIFUL DAUGHTER (James Kirkup trans. 1959). 
 
60
 ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1968). 
 
61
 CHARLES DARWIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES DARWIN (W.W. Norton & Co. 
1958) (1881). 
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Franklin,64 Mohandas Gandhi,65 Helen Keller,66 Malcolm X,67 Margaret Mead,68 John 
Stuart Mill,69 John Henry Newman,70 Jean Jacques Rousseau,71 and Natan 
Sharansky.72  Of course, for some free speech purposes we would want to judge 
these books only as a whole.73  But for analytical purposes, we can also make 
defensible judgments as to whether, say, a sentence, or paragraph, or chapter, is 
about the writer, and whether that speech implicates a matter of public interest and 
concern. 
Our constitutional free speech jurisprudence carefully and explicitly 
distinguishes in several contexts between speech on matters of public versus private 
interest.  The context in which precisely this distinction is most frequently drawn is 
probably that of a free speech defense to public employer discipline of a public 
employee, where the discipline is allegedly based on the employee’s somehow 
objectionable speech.74 
In such cases, hornbook law has it that “[w]hether an employer’s speech 
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and 
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”75  The content of the 
                                                          
 
62
 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN 
AMERICAN SLAVE, WRITTEN BY HIMSELF (Bedford Books ed., 1993) (1854) (noting that the 
distinctly political point of the title’s declaration that a former slave was responsible for the 
prose, style, and content). 
 
63
 ANNE FRANK, ANNE FRANK: THE DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL (Pocket Cardinal ed., B.M. 
Mooyaart-Doubleday trans., Pocket Books 1953) (1947). 
 
64
 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (Charles W. Eliot 
ed., Tribeca Books  2011) (1791). 
 
65
 MOHANDAS K. GANDHI, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH 
TRUTH (Mahadev Desai trans., 1993) (1927). 
 
66
 HELEN KELLER, THE STORY OF MY LIFE (Modern Library ed., 2003) (1903). 
 
67
 MALCOLM X AS TOLD TO ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (Penguin 
Books ed., 2001) (1965). 
 
68
 MARGARET MEAD, BLACKBERRY WINTER: MY EARLY YEARS (1972). 
 
69
 JOHN STUART MILL, 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL: AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND 
LITERARY ESSAYS (John M. Robson ed., 2006) (1873). 
 
70
 JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN: APOLOGIA PRO VITA SUA (Martin J. Svaglic ed., 
1967) (1865). 
 
71
 JEAN-JACQUES  ROUSSEAU, THE CONFESSIONS OF JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU (J.M. Cohen 
trans., 1953) (1782). 
 
72
 NATAN SHARANSKY, FEAR NO EVIL (Stefani Hoffman trans., 1988). 
 
73
 For example, obscenity prosecutions typically assess the work taken as a whole.  See, 
e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 
74
 For discussion of whether a particular instance of public employee speech rises to the 
level of speech on a matter of public interest and concern, see, for example, Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983). 
 
75
 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. 
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speech is often the most important single factor, and it is said that speech addresses a 
matter of public, rather than of personal or private concern, if it is “of political, 
social, or other concern to the community.”76 
This distinction is important for our purposes because the Supreme Court has 
held that “public officials enjoy ‘wide latitude’”77 in responding to public employee 
speech on matters of merely personal or private concern “without ‘intrusive 
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.’”78  The idea is 
roughly that mere personal grievances, without broader public implications, do not 
generally implicate the most vital and most central concerns of the First 
Amendment.79 
The underlying reasoning seems to be that  
speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment 
concern” because “[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of 
public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful 
dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of 
liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press.”80   
Thus in the absence of a “subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of 
general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication,”81 
the public concern standard is not met and the speech in question does not receive 
substantial free speech protection.82 
A number of public employee speech discipline cases collectively provide at 
least some guidance in applying this schema of two distinct levels of speech 
protection.83  Some cases—toward either end of the continuum—are easy and 
                                                          
 
76
 Id. at 146. 
 
77
 Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Connick, 
461 U.S. at 146). 
 
78
 Id. at 338 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146). 
 
79
 See, e.g., Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Borden v. Sch. 
Dist., 523 F.3d 153, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 
80
 Id. (quoting the defamation case of Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 759-60 (1985) (plurality opinion)). 
 
81
 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam). 
 
82
 Id. at 84-85. 
 
83
 See, e.g., Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(showing matters of (inherent) public concern as encompassing governmental functioning, the 
performance of government agencies, possible government discrimination or civil rights 
violations, threats to public safety; noting a circuit split on whether all public employee 
courtroom testimony is (inherently) of public concern regardless of its content; refusing to 
adopt any precise definition or multi-factor test in this regard; with internally expressed 
employee grievances as likely outside the category); Dahl v. Rice Cnty., 621 F.3d 740, 744 
(8th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing between informing the public of governmental malfeasance 
and a focus on a supervisor’s mere unpleasant demeanor); Gross v. Town of Cicero, 619 F.3d 
697, 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (seeking to distinguish between public employment sex 
discrimination as a likely matter of public concern, and purely personal grievances regarding 
public employment sexual harassment, which are not within the scope of free speech 
protection) (citing Seventh Circuit authority); Deutsch v. Jordan, 618 F.3d 1093, 1100 (10th 
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uncontroversial.  Consider two clear hypothetical examples.  A public agency 
accountant who testifies in court that the mayor is bankrupting the city through a 
pattern of embezzlement is generally speaking on a matter of public concern.  A 
public university professor’s complaint that his office should be slightly nearer to the 
candy machine is generally not, in the absence of an unusual context. 
Of course, there remain indeterminate, middle-ground cases, the number of 
which should not be underestimated.  At least in some instances, whether we judge 
the speech in question to be on a matter of public concern or not may crucially 
reflect how we controversially choose to characterize the speech in question.  Many 
workplace grievances that are otherwise merely personal may involve alleged 
violations of official policy, of binding law, or may involve the waste of public 
resources. 
In such middle-ground cases, we have a reasonable choice between alternative 
characterizations of the actual speech in question.  How we reasonably choose to 
then describe the subject of the speech may determine the outcome of the case.  This 
point is akin to the well-known problem of choosing among possible levels of verbal 
generality in a description, as discussed by Professor Mark Tushnet84 and others.85 
Let us consider an actual case example.  In one case, the plaintiff public school 
teacher employees asserted that “their complaints involved subjects ranging from the 
discipline of the students to the legality and desirability of suggested educational 
programs to other teachers’ disregard for school procedures when making school-
related decisions . . . .”86  These are clearly characterizations of the school 
employees’ speech, and not “quotations” thereof.  It is arguably possible that the 
school employees’ speech in this case was entirely about trivial matters, entirely 
about publicly important matters, or some mixture of the two. 
Once we hear the actual speech in its actual context, we may judge the speech to 
be easily classifiable as on a matter of public concern, or just as easily classifiable as 
                                                          
Cir. 2010) (“[S]peech which discloses any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other 
malfeasance on the part of city officials clearly concerns matters of public import.”) (quoting 
Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998)) (showing that symmetrically 
judging that speech alleging and speech defending against allegations of official misconduct 
ordinarily amount to speech on a matter of public interest); Dill, 155 F.3d at 1099 n.1 (noting 
the circuit split on whether public employee trial testimony is per se on a matter of public 
concern); LeFande v. District of Columbia, 613 F.3d 1155, 1158-60 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(discussing the crucial Connick, 461 U.S. 138, case in some detail; speech on mere officer 
morale, employee “beef,” and public employee “misbehavior” as not rising to the level of a 
matter of public concern); Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 612 F.3d 1140, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“internal power struggles within the workplace” and “the minutiae of workplace 
grievances” as outside the scope of (speech on) matters of public concern); Anthoine v. North 
Cent. Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 748-49 (9th Cir. 2010) (showing a “report 
regarding the agency’s failure to comply with its legal obligations” as clearly speech on a 
matter of public concern); Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1050-51 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (discussing and applying Connick, 461 U.S. 138). 
 
84
 See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 165 (1988). 
 
85
 See, e.g., the debate between Justices Scalia and Brennan in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
491 U.S. 110 (1989); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the 
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990).  
 
86
 Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 899 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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on a matter of personal or private concern.  Even in the closer middle ground cases, 
though, it may still be possible to make some reasonable progress in fairly 
classifying the speech in question.87 
Taken as a whole, the public employee speech cases show that the basic 
distinction upon which Chief Judge Kozinski himself and others rely—between  
something like political or public interest-oriented speech and speech narrowly about 
oneself or one’s personal concerns—is often reasonably manageable, with the courts 
generally according far less free speech protection to the latter sort of speech.88 
A similar matter of public concern/matter of personal concern distinction is, we 
might emphasize, also employed in a number of the defamation cases,89 and in other 
free speech contexts,90 all to a similar effect, as Judge Kozinski himself91 has 
elsewhere recognized.92  In these contexts, too, speech about matters of personal but 
not public interest receives substantially less First Amendment protection. 
We are, however, not yet in a position to conclude that on the normative merits, 
speech about oneself that does not also address a matter of public concern 
nevertheless should or should not receive free speech protection akin to that of 
political speech.  On that normative question, we provide further perspective below. 
                                                          
 
87
 See R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 27 (1987).  The suggestion here is to ask, in a close case, about the various costs the 
speaker would realistically have faced if the speaker had sought to re-formulate the speech, or 
change the context of the speech, so as to make the speech significantly more clearly on a 
matter of public interest.  See id.  For one alternative approach, see Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, 
Concern With Public Concern: Toward a Better Definition of the Pickering/Connick 
Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993 (1997). 
 
88
 See cases cited supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text. 
 
89
 See, e.g., the plurality and (more skeptical) dissenting opinions in the defamation case 
of Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774 (1985); Chandok v. 
Klessig, 632 F.3d 803, 814 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In Dun & Bradstreet the Court noted that speech 
on matters that are of purely private concern is of less First Amendment importance.”); TMJ 
Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175, 1185 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 
90
 See, in particular, the widely discussed military funeral protest case of Snyder v. Phelps, 
131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215-17 (2011) (“[W]here matters of purely private significance are at issue, 
First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.”) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)); Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (“[R]estricting speech on purely 
private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on 
matters of public interest.”) (citing Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760, 762). 
 
91
 See Hart v. Massanari, 226 F.3d 1155, 1170 n.25 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J., 
discussing the Dun & Bradstreet case in this context). 
 
92
 For critical discussion of this distinction in the constitutional defamation context, see 
Stephen J. Mattingly, Drawing a Dangerous Line: Why the Public Concern Test in the 
Constitutional Law of Defamation Is Harmful to the First Amendment and What Courts 
Should Do About It, 47 LOUISVILLE L. REV. 739 (2009); Nat Stern, Private Concerns of 
Private Plaintiffs: Revisiting a Problematic Defamation Category, 65 MO. L. REV. 597 (2000). 
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IV.  THE SELF, AUTONOMY, SELF-REALIZATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
The traditional idea of the self has had enthusiastic advocates.93  But especially of 
late, the very idea of the self has taken a battering.94  Some familiar conceptions of 
the self are still defended,95 though, and for our purposes, we need take no issue with 
Judge Kozinski’s reliance on the idea of the self96 as a topic of speech.  We assume 
that Judge Kozinski and others are using the idea of the self in some familiar sense, 
in which the self is in crucial respects deeply social.97  To entirely abandon the idea 
                                                          
 
93
 See, e.g., RALPH WALDO EMERSON, SELF-RELIANCE (1841), available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/5/104.html; GEORG SIMMEL, FREEDOM AND THE INDIVIDUAL: ON 
INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIAL FORMS 217 (Donald L. Levine ed., Richard P. Albares trans., 
1971) (1957) (describing the development of the themes of modern individuality and freedom 
from the time of the Italian Renaissance); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE 
MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 368-69 (1989).  
 
94
 See, e.g., DANIEL DENNETT, Conditions of Personhood, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 
175, 175 (Amelia Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1976) (“In the end we may come to realize that the 
concept of a person [perhaps distinguishable from a ‘self’] is incoherent and obsolete.”); 
RAYMOND MARTIN & JOHN BARRESI, THE RISE AND FALL OF SOUL AND SELF: AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 297 (2006) (showing that recently, 
“[P]sychologists and cultural theorists not only demoted the self, but dismantled it as a unitary 
object of study.”); GALEN STRAWSON, The Self, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 335, 359 (Raymond 
Martin & John Barresi eds., 2003) (“[T]he basic form of our consciousness is that of a gappy 
series of eruptions of consciousness from a substrate of apparent non-consciousness.”); 
STRAWSON, supra at 340 (“[P]erhaps the so-called self is just the human being incompletely 
grasped and illegitimately spiritualized.”); CHARLES TALIAFERRO, The Soul of the Matter, in 
THE SOUL HYPOTHESIS: INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL 26, 33 (Mark C. 
Baker & Stewart Goetz eds., 2011) (citing DENNETT, supra, as arguing that there is no inner 
self, as opposed to “multiple parallel processes,” and that the ‘self’ is merely a useful 
abstraction, vaguely like a “center of narrative gravity”). 
 
95
 Even Professor Galen Strawson concedes that “all languages have words which lend 
themselves naturally to playing the role that ‘the self’ plays in English, however murky that 
role may be . . . It has a natural use in religious, philosophical, and psychological contexts, 
which are very natural contexts of discussion for human beings.”  STRAWSON, supra note 94, 
at 336.  See also JERROLD SEIGEL, THE IDEA OF THE SELF: THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE IN 
WESTERN EUROPE SINCE THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 3 (reprint ed., 2005) (“By ‘self’ we 
commonly mean the particular being any person is . . . [distinguishes one being from another,] 
draws the parts of our existence together, persists through changes, or opens the way to 
becoming who we might or should be.”); RICHARD SORABJI, SELF: ANCIENT AND MODERN 
INSIGHTS ABOUT INDIVIDUALITY, LIFE, AND DEATH 4 (2006) (“There has been much opposition 
to the idea of the self, but often the opposition turns out to be a particular philosophical idea of 
self as something disembodied and undetectable, like a soul or a Cartesian ego.  But this is 
only one conception of the self.”); SORABJI, supra, at 17 (discussing further the opposition to 
the idea of the self).  For some fascinating debates on the self, see THE WANING OF 
MATERIALISM (Robert C. Koons & George Bealer eds., 2010). 
 
96
 See United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in the 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
 
97
 See SEIGEL, supra note 95, at 4 (noting the modern emphasis on the sociality of the self 
through language systems, “communities, nations, classes, or cultures”); CHRISTIAN SMITH, 
WHAT IS A PERSON?: RETHINKING HUMANITY, SOCIAL LIFE, AND THE MORAL GOOD FROM THE 
PERSON UP (2010).  See also supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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of the self in this familiar social sense would actually seem to require a revolution in 
thought and practice.98  In any event, we will take no issue with Judge Kozinski’s 
usage.  Like Judge Kozinski, we shall treat speech about public issues as overlapping 
with, but not inherent in, speech that is about oneself.  Some speech about oneself 
will thus not (also) be about public or political matters. 
Let us focus then, with Judge Kozinski, on non-political, non-public interest-
focused speech about oneself.  Does such speech, on the merits, deserve stringent 
free speech protection akin to that of political or public interest-focused speech?  The 
most obvious way to address such a question would be to ask to what extent a given 
kind of speech tends to promote the basic purposes of constitutionally protecting 
speech in the first place.  By consensus, the basic purposes of special protection for 
speech in general focus on the pursuit of truth of one sort or another,99 promoting 
and maintaining a functioning democracy,100 and some form of autonomy or personal 
self-realization.101 
On this sensible approach, the case for protecting speech that is about oneself, 
but without implicating any matter of public concern, as on par with political speech 
seems extremely doubtful.  To begin with, speech about oneself not also implicating 
any public concern can, in the usual course, hardly promote or contribute to 
democratic government as directly as most political speech does.  On the other hand, 
some personal speech can, through an unintended logical or causal chain, 
nevertheless inspire political thoughts in a listener.102  But for that matter, so can 
entirely unprotected speech, such as obscenity,103 or actions that are not even 
symbolic speech.104  Some political speech might actually tend in practice, if not 
intention, to undermine, rather than promote, democracy.105  But we do not typically 
                                                          
 
98
 For the practical robustness and importance of some distinction between self and other, 
see, e.g., MARTIN & BARRESI, supra note 94, at 304 (“whether or not, in theory, persons or 
selves persist through changes, in practice, they do; lenders still expect debtors to repay their 
debts and debtors are still obligated to repay them”) (or if not, we at least have some idea of 
who has filed for bankruptcy and who has not).  At least one major philosopher, however, has 
argued that deflating familiar ideas of the self and of personal identity could be manageable.  
See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 281 (1984) (“My death will break the more direct 
relations between my present experiences and future experiences, but it will not break certain 
other relations . . . Instead of saying ‘I shall be dead,’ I should say, ‘There will be no future 
experiences that will be related, in certain ways, to these present experiences.’”). 
 
99
 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 
100
 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 
101
 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 
102
 Roughly as a glorious sunrise might prompt a renewed personal or political optimism. 
 
103
 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 
104
 For discussion of what does or does not amount to speech, see R. George Wright, What 
Counts as “Speech” in the First Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 
PEPP. L. REV. 1217 (2010). 
 
105
 Provoking a frenzied mob to political violence might, in limited cases, fall into this 
category.  Much of the first half of the twentieth century’s free speech law embraces similar 
restrictions.  But see the “heckler’s veto” free speech case of Terminiello v. Chicago, 339 U.S. 
1 (1949). 
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trust the legislatures and executive to thus characterize particular instances of 
political speech and to therefore provide only lesser constitutional protection for 
such speech, except in extreme cases.106 
What, though, if we instead consider the alternative basic free speech value of 
promoting the search for truth?  Would speech about oneself seem distinctly 
valuable in that context?  There are more possible kinds of truths to be pursued than 
truth just in the political realm.  One might well argue that there can be truths of 
psychology,107 philosophy,108 literature,109 or science in general, and that speech 
about the speaker can at least occasionally claim to make contributions in these 
respects.110 
We have no objection to the idea that some speech that is about oneself may also 
be intended to promote the search for truth in any of several broader fields.  We may 
think of Augustine’s Confessions,111 in part, as Augustine speaking about himself.  
But it would hardly be fair to assume that those portions of the Confessions cannot 
also be intended to tell us anything arguably true about the culture or even the human 
personality more broadly. 
The main response, though, should again be that the law can simply protect, to 
whatever appropriate degree, speech that is intended to make a contribution to the 
search for truth as the law understands that search.  Some speech that is about 
oneself may qualify, but much will not.  There is again no reason to focus on the 
broad category of speech that is about oneself, and to uniformly exalt its 
constitutional status, overall, to one akin to political or public concern speech. 
Thus far, then, we have seen no convincing reason to ignore the basic insight that 
speech about oneself is often no more than that, and can hardly claim to be seeking 
to advance any of the consensual basic free speech values.112  But the most 
interesting argument for exalted protection for speech about oneself has not yet been 
                                                          
 
106
 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (rather stringently protecting even 
potentially dangerous political speech); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 635 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (stating that even false electoral speech is protected by a strict scrutiny test). 
 
107
 It is occasionally possible to better understand some aspects of human psychology by 
careful introspection, and reporting what we have discovered of ourselves. 
 
108
 Similarly, some might argue that philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the truth of the 
idea of free will can be pursued in autobiographical terms, by experiencing and then seeking 
to speak truly about the experiences of the self.  But for one skeptical view among many, see 
the observations of Professor Richard Rorty in RICHARD RORTY & PASCAL ENGEL, WHAT’S 
THE USE OF TRUTH? (William McCuaig trans., 2007). 
 
109
 For an example of speech about the self constituting a literary contribution, see, for 
example, 1 MARCEL PROUST,  SWANN’S WAY (D.J. Enright rev. ed., C.K. Scott Moncrieff & 
Terence Kilmartin trans., Random House 1992) (1981).  Several of the more political 
autobiographies cited supra notes 58-72 could also be credited with distinct literary value.  
For how a court assesses the rather different idea of “serious” such value in an allegedly 
“obscene” work, see Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). 
 
110
 This is not to suggest that the speech about oneself is genuinely equally likely to also 
constitute an arguable contribution to the search for truths about each of these various areas. 
 
111
 SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS (Oxford World Classics ed., Henry Chadwick trans., 
1998). 
 
112
 See supra text accompanying notes 99-101. 
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addressed.  It is often suggested that one of the basic purposes of free speech 
protection is to promote personal autonomy or self-realization, however 
understood.113  Given the emphasis therein on the self and on the person, doesn’t this 
autonomy or self-realization-focused approach hold some promise for 
constitutionally elevating speech about oneself generally? 
As it turns out, though, matters are not so simple.  The relevant ideas of 
autonomy and self-realization have been and remain murky, if not contested.114  
While some conceptions of promoting autonomy and self-realization do seem to help 
the Kozinski argument, other conceptions do not, in that there is again only a limited 
overlap between speech about oneself and clearly important senses of autonomy and 
self-realization. 
If we consider what has been said historically about autonomy and self-
realization, we find a variety of meanings.115  In one sense of the term ‘autonomous,’ 
we can link the autonomous self to a reasonable self,116 a higher self,117 a real self,118 
an ideal self,119 or to a self that displays self-mastery120 as opposed to bondage to 
immediate impulse.121  Thus in Rousseau’s classic phrase describing positive or 
moral freedom, “to be governed by appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to a 
law one prescribes to oneself is freedom.”122 
                                                          
 
113
 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 
114
 See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 179 (Henry Hardy 
ed., 2002); GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 6 (1988); T.H. 
GREEN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF T.H. GREEN 52 (John R. Rodman ed., 1964) (1881) 
(referncing on T.H. Green’s work, see DAVID O. BRINK, PERFECTIONISM AND THE COMMON 
GOOD: THEMES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF T.H. GREEN (2003); Avital Shimony, Beyond Negative 
and Positive Freedom: T.H. Green’s View of Freedom, 21 POL. THEORY 28 (1993)); Ian 
Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (October 8, 
2007) available at, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative; John N. Gray, 
On Negative and Positive Liberty, 28 POL. STUD. 507 (1978); Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., 
Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312 (1967); Charles Taylor, What’s Wrong 
With Negative Liberty?, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, 2 PHIL. PAPERS 211 
(1985). 
 
115
 See DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 6 (regarding the term ‘autonomy’: “[i]t is very 
unlikely that there is a core meaning which underlies all of these various uses of the term”); 
John Christman, Saving Positive Freedom, 31 POL. THEORY 79, 87 (2005) (“Autonomy is 
defined in various ways.”). 
 
116
 See BERLIN, supra note 114, at 179. 
 
117
 Id. 
 
118
 Id. 
 
119
 Id. 
 
120
 Id. 
 
121
 Id. 
 
122
 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. I, ch. 8, at 65 (Maurice Cranston 
trans., 1968) (1762). 
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Of course, appeals to a self that is supposedly higher, truer, or more authentic 
than the merely empirical or subjective self are subject to monumental abuse.123  
There are sound reasons to limit reliance on the idea of a higher and better self, as 
determined by the powerful, when we establish the meaning and aim of autonomy.  
We could reduce the risk of abuse by following John Stuart Mill in thinking of 
liberty, with some careful qualifications, in terms of “doing as we like.”124 
But even Mill himself thinks of liberty and autonomy in terms well beyond one 
being socially unhindered in doing as one likes.  How did we come to have the 
‘likes’ we do?  Freely?  Mill contrasts the role of reason, as distinct from passing 
desires, in assessing our progress and development.125  Freedom and diversity are 
necessary for the sake of “the highest and most harmonious development of [the 
person’s] powers to a complete and consistent whole.”126  This cannot be reduced to 
merely doing as one likes, however one’s desires were generated and molded. 
When Mill compares the circumstances of two persons, he does not focus 
entirely on their respective degrees of subjective satisfaction, or even on the degree 
to which both persons are doing as they like.127  Famously, Mill argues instead that it 
is “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”128  Persons “addicted” to 
lower pleasures, rather than choosing deliberately and autonomously between higher 
and lower pleasures, may disagree, but Mill finds their claims unconvincing.129 
Mill’s line of thought on this sense of freedom and autonomy or self-realization 
is then elaborated by T.H. Green.  Green bluntly declares that “the mere enabling 
[of] a man to do as he likes, is in itself no contribution to true freedom.”130  A bit 
more expansively, Green argues that: 
[W]e measure the progress of a society by . . . the increasing development 
and exercise on the whole of those powers of contributing to social good 
with which we believe the members of society to be endowed; in short, by 
                                                          
 
123
 See generally 2 KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th rev. ed., 1971); 
J.L. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1952). 
 
124
 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 71 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974) (1859).  Mill goes 
on to qualify this definition, but without immediately raising the question of whether liberty or 
its opposite could be involved in the various ways in which we may come to like some of the 
things we do. 
 
125
 See id. at 121. 
 
126
 Id. (citing Wilhelm von Humboldt, THE SPHERE AND DUTIES OF GOVERNMENT (1852), 
reprinted in THE LIMITS OF STATE ACTION 11-13 (J.W. Burrow, ed., Cambridge, 1969)). 
 
127
 Compare id. with JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM ch. 2 (1863), available at 
http://www.utilitarianism.com/mill2.htm. 
 
128
 MILL, supra note 127 (going on to argue for the addictiveness, under particular 
circumstances, of lower pleasures, a view that is easily restateable in terms of autonomy). 
 
129
 See id. Compare the judgment of Mill’s near contemporary, MATTHEW ARNOLD, 
CULTURE AND ANARCHY: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CRITICISM ch. 2, at 51 (1869), 
available at http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/arnold/writings/2.html (“[C]ulture is, or 
ought to be, the study and pursuit of perfection.”). 
 
130
 GREEN, supra note 114. 
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the greater power on the part of the citizens as a body to make the most 
and best of themselves.131 
Green thus follows Mill in emphasizing genuinely developmental self-realization 
rather than merely speaking or acting as one likes as the crucial point of freedom.  
Not all speech about oneself promotes or seeks in the slightest to promote self-
realization or autonomy in this sense. 
Let us briefly recapitulate.  If we are to follow Judge Kozinski and others in 
according the strongest general level of free speech protection to speech that is about 
oneself, we will want to be able to point to some consensually important basic free 
speech goal or purpose we can distinctively promote by doing so.  We have found, 
however, that the courts often distinguish between, and decline to attribute equal 
constitutional value to, speech that is, or is not, about a matter of public concern.  
We have seen that some speech about oneself can be political, or on a matter of 
public concern.  But much speech about oneself, we concluded, does not fall into this 
latter category.  Such speech is typically not intended by its speaker as even in part a 
contribution to discussion of self-government, democracy, or any particular public 
issue.  Nor is such speech about the self typically intended to contribute to the 
pursuit of truth in any recognized general cultural realm. 
It is also contestable whether speech about oneself, but not also about any public 
concern, generally advances the free speech value of autonomy in arguably the most 
important and valuable sense of ‘autonomy.’  Speaking merely of oneself, apart from 
any matter of public concern, doubtless advances the speaker’s autonomy in the 
sense of speaking, or otherwise acting, just as one may care, for whatever reason, to 
speak.  One thus wishes to, and does, speak merely about oneself.  But speaking of 
oneself, again, only partially overlaps with, and often does not encompass, autonomy 
in the sense of recognizable self-realization, or promoting one’s arguably highest and 
best self.132 
This is of course not to suggest that speech about oneself that does not even seek 
to promote the speaker’s flourishing is of no value at all, or, even more dramatically, 
that governments should commonly intervene, perhaps coercively, when persons 
speak in ways that do not promote their flourishing.  That would of course be 
intolerable and counterproductive, if not totalitarian.133  But that does not mean that 
speaking about oneself in, for example, concededly trivial ways deserves essentially 
the same degree of first amendment protection as political speech.  It is obviously 
inappropriate for the government to regulate most trivial speech, but that hardly 
                                                          
 
131
 Id.  
 
132
 Provocatively, the psychologist Abraham Maslow argued, at least preliminarily, that 
persons otherwise evaluated as highly realized or “self-actualized” tend to focus on problems 
outside of themselves rather than on themselves, and in this sense they tend to be “problem-
centered rather than ego-centered.”  ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 
159 (2d ed., 1970). 
 
133
 Relatedly, for the free speech status of what has been called “casual chit-chat,” see 
Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 887 (7th Cir. 2003); Swank v. Smart, 889 F.2d 1247, 1251-53 
(7th Cir. 1990) (showing that Judge Posner recognizing that government attempts to regulate 
even admittedly trivial speech could raise a host of constitutional issues beyond the First 
Amendment).  See also LeFande v. District of Columbia, 613 F.3d 1155,1162; Contreras v. 
City of Chicago, 920 F. Supp. 1370, 1388 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
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makes the trivial speech less trivial, or worthy of the same degree of presumed free 
speech protection as non-trivial or political speech.134 
All of our assessments above of the free speech value of speech that is about the 
self but not also about matters of public concern stand by themselves, on their own 
merits.  More speculatively, though, we might also briefly try to put our conclusions 
in a cultural context.  We live in a particular culture, with particular cultural 
strengths and weaknesses.  Suppose we were to elevate virtually all speech about 
oneself, even apart from any matter of public concern, to the highest general levels 
of first amendment protection.  If this constitutional reform were to be adopted, what 
sorts of indirect consequences might we anticipate given our broader culture?  
Below, we take up merely one important strand among the possible arguments. 
V.  SPEECH ABOUT ONESELF AND THE VALUE OF NARCISSISM 
We have assumed throughout that speech about oneself that also addresses a 
matter of public concern deserves at least some elevated level of free speech 
scrutiny, and that such speech deserves rigorous protection if the speech can be 
characterized as political.  This would of course admit of no exception for the 
(political) speech of outsiders, the marginalized, and the oppressed, or for speech by 
anyone raising related issues and concerns.135 
The main area of contention, then, is over speech about oneself that does not 
address any such public issue or concern.  The speech in that sense is personal or 
private.  Speech of this sort is of course a main constituent of many ordinary social 
encounters.  Such speech has its own sorts of value, even if such speech does not 
qualify as meaningfully promoting the basic free speech values.  But it is difficult, 
especially in our own contemporary culture, to reflect on speech that is focused 
solely on the speaking self without thinking also of one form or another of the idea 
of narcissism. 
The idea of narcissism is used in various senses,136 and even measured in 
different ways.137  However the term is used, though, most speech about oneself will 
                                                          
 
134
 See authorities cited supra note 133. 
 
135
 See generally, supra note 47, at 966-67.  The ability to tell an interesting, non-political 
story about oneself seems shared as much by dominant groups as by non-dominant groups.  
As one further complication, speech that is about oneself might, in some cases, also amount to 
commercial speech, deserving of whatever protection is properly accorded to the kind of 
commercial speech in question.  See, e.g., Central Hudson v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557 (1980); Thompson v. W. States Med. Centers, 535 U.S. 357 (2002).  For a discussion by 
Judge Kozinski of commercial speech, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.  See also R. 
George Wright, The Openness of the Commercial Speech Test and the Value of Self-
Realization, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 17 (2010).  We can imagine speech about oneself, in 
the form of a standard employment resume that consists of mainly commercial speech.  But 
resumes may also serve other purposes, and we should be extremely reluctant to conclude that 
most speech about oneself should be classified as commercial speech.  See generally, Va. 
State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  For discussion 
of the idea of alienation, see BERTELL OLLMAN, ALIENATION: MARX’S CONCEPT OF MAN IN 
CAPITALIST SOCIETY (2d ed. 1977). 
 
136
 See. e.g., CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN 
AGE OF DIMINISHING EXPECTATIONS 31-32 (1991 ed.) (1979). 
 
137
 See, e.g., Joshua D. Miller & W. Keith Campbell, Comparing Clinical and Social-
Personality Conceptualizations of Narcissism, 76 J. PERSONALITY 449 (2008) (clinical use of 
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not count as narcissistic speech.138  And much speech that we could classify as 
narcissistic, or as narcissistically driven, will not be about the speaker.139  Nor is it 
actually clear that narcissism, in some undesirable sense, has of late been 
significantly increasing in our own culture.140  Even if it were clear that malign 
                                                          
the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire as capturing an introverted form of narcissism, 
whereas the social personality research-oriented Narcissistic Personality Inventory captures a 
more extraverted form of narcissism). 
 
138
 See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act 3, sc. 4 (1608) (“Poor Tom’s a-
cold”); M. WILLIAM PHELPS, NATHAN HALE: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AMERICA’S FIRST SPY (“I 
only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country.”) (quote attributed to Nathan Hale, 
upon his execution in 1776). 
 
139
 Consider one of the standard items on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory: 
“Everybody likes to hear my stories.”  Robert Raskin & Howard Terry, A Principal 
Components Analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory and Further Evidence of Its 
Construct Validity, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 890, 894 (1988).  Presumably even 
the most narcissistic person could talk about politics without explicitly referring to himself. 
 
140
 For contrasting views as to whether the United States has over the last generation or so 
seen a meaningful increase in narcissism, or in narcissism scores, compare JEAN M. TWENGE, 
GENERATION ME: WHY TODAY’S YOUNG AMERICANS ARE MORE CONFIDENT, ASSERTIVE, 
ENTITLED—AND MORE MISERABLE THAN EVER BEFORE 82 (2006) (“Almost 1 out of 20 
college students expects to become an actor, artist, or musician, more than want to be lawyers, 
nurses, accountants, business owners, journalists, or high school teachers.”);  JEAN M. 
TWENGE & W. KEITH CAMPBELL, THE NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC: LIVING IN THE AGE OF 
ENTITLEMENT 30-31 (2009) (“College students in the 2000s were significantly more 
narcissistic than Gen Xers and Baby Boomers in the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s.”); TWENGE & 
CAMPBELL, supra at 34 (referring to the questionnaire item “I am an important person,” only 
12% of teens in 1951 responded with agreement, whereas in 1989, 80% of teen girls and 77% 
of teen boys did so); Jean M. Twenge & Joshua D. Foster, Birth Cohort Increases in 
Narcissistic Personality Traits Among American College Students, 1982-2009, 1 SOCIAL 
PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 99 (2010); Jean M. Twenge & Joshua D. Foster, Mapping the 
Scale of the Narcissism Epidemic: Increases in Narcissism 2002-2007 Within Ethnic Groups, 
42 J. RES. PERSONALITY 1619 (2008); John Tierney, A Generation’s Vanity, Heard Through 
Lyrics, N.Y. TIMES (April 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/science/26tier.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=John%20Tierney,
%0A%20Generation%E2%80%99s%20Vanity,%20Heard%20Through%20Lyrics,&st=cse 
(referring to Professor Twenge’s co-authored analysis of popular song lyrics over the period 
of 1980-2007 finding an increase in self-focus and references to negative or antisocial 
behavior); M. Brent Donneallen et al., An Emerging Epidemic of Narcissism Or Much Ado 
About Nothing?, 43 J. RES. PERSONALITY 498 (2009) (finding minimal evidence of recently 
increased college student narcissism); M. Brent Donneallen & Kali H. Trzesniewski, 
Groundhog Day Versus Alice in Wonderland, Red Herrings Versus Swedish Fishes, and 
Hopefully Something Constructive: A Reply to Comments, 5 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 103 
(2010) (emphasizing developmental over generational effects); Brent W. Roberts et al., It Is 
Developmental Me, Not Generational Me: Developmental Changes Are More Important Than 
Generational Changes in Narcissism—Commentary on Trzesniewski & Donneallen (2010), 5 
PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 97, 101 (2010) (“[E]very generation is Generation Me.”); Kali H. 
Trzesniewski et al., Do Today’s Young People Really Think They Are So Extraordinary?: An 
Examination of Secular Trends in Narcissism and Self-Enhancement, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 181 
(2008) (finding no significant overall increase on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory among 
college students from the 1980s to 2007).  It seems difficult to believe that today’s college 
students are especially overconfident in how far their ability will carry them economically, 
even if they evaluate themselves generously in other respects. 
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narcissism were increasing, we should hesitate to allow perhaps passing social trends 
to unduly influence constitutional free speech law. 
Instead, we are supposing herein that narcissism, in some largely undesirable 
sense,141 disproportionately reflects a concern for oneself, at the expense of a 
perceptive concern for the long-term good of others or for the broader public 
interest.  If this is so, we should hesitate to validate or even unintentionally promote 
narcissism by reforming fundamental law to exalt speech that is merely about the 
self, with no intended further social import or value. 
The narcissist, we assume for our purposes, tends to be more preoccupied with 
the self than the non-narcissist.  The self will tend to loom larger in importance for 
the narcissist.  As Richard Sennett describes the original myth of Narcissus, “he is in 
love with his own beauty, but the myth would still make sense if he were in love 
with his unhappiness . . . [H]e wants to get closer and closer to the image of himself 
reflected on the water’s surface. . . .”142 
But apart from the general unattractiveness of self-absorption, why not re-write 
the free speech rules to provide greater implicit validation for narcissism?  At least 
some forms of narcissism may indeed involve certain benefits, at the very least for 
the narcissist in question.143  But narcissism also, as we might suspect, imposes 
interpersonal and broader social costs which, in the aggregate, strike many as 
disproportionate to narcissism’s collective benefits.144  All else equal, narcissism is 
not to be unnecessarily further validated or legally promoted. 
The social costs of narcissism seem disproportionate whether we think of 
‘narcissism’ as popularly defined,145 as clinically defined,146 as examined in social 
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 The personal and social value of narcissistic traits may vary depending upon how 
narcissism is conceived and measured.  See supra note 137, as well as Paul Rose, The Happy 
and Unhappy Faces of Narcissism, 33 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 379, 379 
(2002) (“[O]vert narcissists report higher self-esteem and higher satisfaction with life, 
whereas covert narcissists report lower self-esteem and lower satisfaction with life.”); Rose, 
supra, at 389 (“[L]ooking down on others has . . . been linked to better health and 
adjustment.”); Paul Wink, Two Faces of Narcissism, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 
590, 590 (1991) (distinguishing two forms of narcissism, but with a common core of 
“exploitativeness and a sense of entitlement” as well as “conceit, self-indulgence, and 
disregard of others”); Wink, supra, at 591 (overt form of narcissism as associated with 
“exhibitionism, self-importance, and preoccupation with receiving attention and admiration 
from others . . . [whereas the covert narcissist may] appear to be hypersensitive, anxious, 
timid, and insecure, but [may] . . . surprise observers with their grandiose fantasies”). 
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 Richard Sennett, Narcissism and Modern Culture, 4 OCTOBER 70, 72 (1977). 
 
143
 See W. Keith Campbell et al., Understanding the Social Costs of Narcissism: The Case 
of the Tragedy of the Commons, 31 PERS. & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 1358, 1358 (2005) (“On 
the positive side of the ledger, narcissists generate and maintain positive feelings surrounding 
the self, including high levels of positive affect, low levels of negative affect, and high self-
esteem.”) (citing Morf & Rhodewalt, infra note 147, and focusing on the relatively common 
narcissistic personality, as opposed to the rare and severe Narcissistic Personality Disorder). 
 
144
 See Campbell et al., supra note 143, including the problem that “narcissists need to 
distort reality into a form conducive to self-enhancement.”  See also TWENGE & CAMPBELL, 
THE NARCISSISM EPIDEMIC, supra note 140, at 42-55; infra notes 145-48. 
 
145
 See Carolyn C. Morf & Frederick Rhodewalt, Unraveling the Paradoxes of Narcissism: 
A Dynamic Self-Regulatory Processing Model, 12 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 177, 177 (2001) 
(defining as ’self-aggrandizing and self-absorbed, yet easily threatened and overly sensitive to 
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science experiments,147 or as characteristic of the society as a whole.148  Nor can we 
view self-absorption and unempathetic indifference to others as merely the 
unfortunate downside of some otherwise distinctive narcissist ideology, political 
viewpoint, or broader philosophy.  As one scholar writes: 
More than any other personality type, what the narcissist personality says 
should be viewed as “calculated for effect.”  The only central and stable 
belief of the narcissist is the centrality of the self.  What is good for him is 
good for his country.  The narcissist does not have any consistent beliefs.  
He is capable of changing any position . . . if to do serves his needs at the 
moment.149 
All things considered then, there seems no net benefit to even indirectly and 
unintentionally validating narcissism by officially elevating the First Amendment 
status of speech about oneself. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We have accepted above the well-established idea that speech about oneself that 
is also intended to convey some sort of political idea or to address some matter of 
public concern can typically be distinguished from speech about oneself with no 
such further intent.  On this basis, we have argued, contrary to recent contentions, 
that the latter sort of speech—speech that is “merely” about the self, or about one’s 
merely personal or private concerns—should not generally qualify for any sort of 
elevated free speech protection.  Fundamentally, this is because such speech does not 
systematically promote any of the consensually recognized and distinctive values or 
purposes justifying special constitutional protection for speech.  And we have also 
suggested, secondarily, that enhanced first amendment protection for such self-
focused speech might unintentionally further validate or even promote the widely 
recognized narcissistic personality, an outcome that is not worth publicly risking.  
Heightened protection for speech that is about the self, with no pretense of broader 
implications, is neither required by current law, nor well-advised as a legal reform. 
 
                                                          
feedback . . . prone to extremes of euphoria, despair and rage . . . charming and socially facile 
while simultaneously insensitive to others’ feelings, wishes, and needs”). 
 
146
 See Morf & Rhodewalt, supra note 145 (defining as “grandiosity, self-focus, and self-
importance . . . they display a sense of entitlement and the expectation of special treatment . . . 
[t]hey are unwilling to reciprocate the favors of others and are unempathetic and 
interpersonally exploitative”). 
 
147
 See Campbell et al., supra note 143, at 1333-67 (specifically “[i]n the context of a 
resource dilemma, narcissism confers a benefit for the self but a longer term cost to others and 
to the commons”). 
 
148
 See LASCH, supra note 136, at XVII (“In a narcissistic society—a society that gives 
increasing prominence and encouragement to narcissistic traits—the cultural devaluation of 
the past reflects not only the poverty of the prevailing ideologies, which have lost their grip on 
reality and abandoned the attempt to master it, but the poverty of the narcissist’s inner life.”). 
 
149
 Jerrold M. Post, Current Concepts of the Narcissistic Personality: Implications for 
Political Psychology, 14 POL. PSYCHOL. 99, 110 (1993).  As well, it is difficult for the 
narcissist either to admit ignorance or to rely on expert advice.  See id. at 104, 110. 
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